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On a cloth untrue, with a twisted cue 
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
And from him who hath not 




Who add field unto field
Until there is no place.
- Isaiah
Preface
The operation of rural impoverishment - and enrichment - in rural Sub-Saharan 
Africa is complex. Almost all simple explanations - and certainly all single 
instrument ones are simply wrong in respect to a majority of cases. That does 
not lessen the prevalence of marginalisation and pauperisation both as present 
realities and as powerful dynamics - it does mean that they need to be 
analysed more carefully and contextually. Nor does it make the struggle to 
find ways in which the processes leading to degradation of rural households 
can be slowed, halted or reversed, any less urgent - the need for complexity 
and contextuality in analysis should not be taken as an excuse for delay. An 
analytical process which produces accurate answers after the pauperisation of 
the victims and the dissolution of their communities has a distinct 
resemblance to the famous Dickensian case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce in which 
the lawyers exhausted the estate not the legal issues to be resolved.
•The following cases are in no sense presented as definitive, typical or an 
adequate basis for an analytical - much less an operational - solution. They 
are intended to illustrate complexity, the importance of contexts, the dangers 
of reductionism and, perhaps, two general themes.
The first of these is political economic. Power matters. Political and 
economic power usually interact, interpenetrate and reinforce each other. 
Those groups (or sub-classes or kinships or regions) outside the national or 
local governing coalition are likely to be the victims of any process of 
change - and the holders of power either the beneficiaries or (in the case of 
disasters such as massive drought) at least able to offload most of the losses 
on others.
This is an important point. To examine individual processes outside the 
overall political economic context is unlikely to explain why the impact of 
drought (or a commodity price boom) varies sharply or why the gains from 
agricultural service provision or expanded rural basic services are far from 
identical in different countries (or even regions within one country). 
Further, if analysis indicates that the basic cause of a dynamic of 
impoverishment for specified sub-classes or kinships or regions is the 
distribution and uses of power then no ’solution' (however nominally 
technically and financially possible) which does not address the question of 
power is likely to have much operational impact.
The second is the abiding and important nature of law - including tradition 
and contract. Abiding in importance, not necessarily in result. In many 
cases the legal and contractual forms have been rather inexpertly transplanted 
from another context or because the legal, traditional and contractual forms 
have remained relatively static in form while the content has changed. As a 
result the content and results of the forms are often very different either 
from what their authors intended or from what they were at an earlier period.
A Positive Example - Almost
In 1981-82 the second Rawlings government in Ghana sought to reduce diversion 
and delays of payments due to tree crop producers. It mandated payment by 
cashable cheque to producers' cooperatives on delivery. Initially this
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related to cocoa, the dominant tree crop and export. However, it was also 
noted by the government that the poorest regions - Northern, Upper East and 
Upper West - had a tree crop in shea nuts which had almost disappeared from 
official trade flows. The Cocobod was therefore instructed to develop a shea 
nut campaign - included payment by cheque to coops analagous to that for 
cocoa.
By 1986 results were evident, How much shea nut sales were up was unclear 
since part of the rise in official purchases probably represented 
rechannelling of trade from traditional neighbouring country oil markets to 
the official channels selling to the newly appeared European skin cream and 
oil market. (Shea nut oil is apparently micro-environmentally sound for human 
skin.) Officially marketed totals rose from the order of $3 million to $30 
million and payments to producers coops from perhaps $1 million to $15 
million. Clearly a success story: higher official exports loosening Ghana's 
foreign exchange strangulation, prompt payment to coops, cash income for very 
poor regions, districts and households, lessening their need to sell part of 
their inadequate food production to meet cash requirements, income for a crop 
sold by women, and therefore especially likely to be used to strengthen 
household nutrition and child welfare. Yes, but....
Shea nuts are not in fact primarily grown albeit a few tree farms do exist. 
90 to 95Í are gathered from wild trees - virtually all by poor women. They 
are sold by the pan - to coop members. As is not the case in cocoa (most 
cocoa producers coops being made up of producers), the shea nut growers coops 
are in a majority of cases dominated by male intermediate buyers. There is 
not - for whatever reasons, probably including limited transport and access to 
cash - perfect competition among the buyers so the average price paid by male 
buyers to female collectors is apparently about half what the buyers collect 
from Cocobod in their guise of producer coop members. The apparent 
unawareness of Accra (understandable at Castle, i.e. State House level but 
less so at Ministry of Agriculture level) of the actual nature of shea nut 
production, marketing and gender division of labour has made the results of 
duplicating the legal pattern of buying for cocoa quite different in its 
distributional effect. The poor women collectors have, it needs to be 
emphasised, not been injured but they have been exploited (in both the vulgar 
and the technical sense) and the large gainers are not poor (and are now 
richer).
Food, Flowers and All What
Self evidently substituting flowers for food contributes to impoverishment and 
malnourishment. Therefore the establishment of carnation growing in Kenya on 
land which might otherwise grow grain is clear contribution to the "other 
half" dying. So runs the simple food first argument. But is it that simple?
Kenya has a substantial grain surplus - at least defined in terms of effective 
demand. Malnutrition is linked to poverty not to physical unavailability of 
food. Too many households with too little, too poor and too risky (in terms 
of rainfall patterns) and too few jobs underlie poverty. How do carnations 
(or tea or other non-food crops) relate to poverty and therefore to effective 
access to food?
Many non-food crops - including both tea and Nairobi elite or export market 
horticulture and (a fortiori!) carnations have a far higher gross output value 
per hectare than grain (6 to 8 times for tea, up to 100 times for carnations). 
Even allowing for higher input costs the labour required (employment or self 
employment provided) for many of these crops is several times as high per 
hectare as that for grain. Grain exports are - at best - marginally viable 
(especially in the face of USA and EEC dumping/subsidisation) and while Kenya 
cannot fairly be described as subject to import strangulation, constraints on 
import capacity do hold output - especially in manufacturing - below 
potentially attainable levels.
So.... non-food crops, including export crops such as carnations (a dramatic 
example albeit tea is perhaps a more typical and certainly larger example) can 
increase exports and therefore operating levels in manufacturing, raise 
agricultural sector gross output and provide more employment and self 
employment allowing the employees/growers to buy more (readily available) 
food. At that level it appears that the last way to reduce hunger would be to 
force reductions in the 10 to 12% of farmed area devoted to non-food crops. 
And up to a point that is true. But....
The nature of crop growing and marketing varies markedly - perhaps for 
technical reasons. New tea is largely allocated to smallholders (doubtless
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not the poorest of the poor but rarely rich either) and marketed through a 
relatively cost effective, high payout procurement, processing and sale body. 
Even if serious question marks hover over Nairobi tea exchange prices it is 
hard to argue that small Kenyan farmers do not benefit from tea growing.
Carnations are more complex. Because they are perishable and fashionable, 
quality control and instant (same day air freight) marketing are essential.
Because the import ends of the market are specialised and fairly tightly
controlled the margin between London wholesale, free on plane Nairobi and farm 
gate prices are very high. The actual growers may be small in number of 
hectares but not in scale either of financial investment or turnover. The 
hired workers are better off than urban semi or semi-self employed or marginal 
farmers but probably not very much. A grave suspicion must exist that the 
main beneficiaries are not employees, Kenyan growers nor even the Kenyan 
economy albeit it is hard to argue any of these lose absolutely if the
alternative to carnations is grain (or, less clearly, another horticultural 
product).
The underlying problem is probably not legal. The labour, purchase and export 
contracts are all (or almost all) legally correct and not on the face of it 
oppressive. On the face of it.... this is a line of business in which 
specialised, near instant knowledge is power. Kenyan workers, growers, tax 
officers and exchange control (export proceeds remittance monitoring 
personnel) neither have that knowledge nor any very evident way of acquiring 
it.
"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey"
Oliver Goldsmith’s best known line from the "Deserted Village" applies 
forcibly to the Western Sudan - including its causal conclusion "when wealth 
accumulates and men decay". Indeed it should as the dynamic is the same - 
enclosure of previously "common" land, expulsion of herders and peasants, 
advance of freehold tenure. The only differences are not in the Sudan’s 
favour - the enclosing landlords of Britain by and large were improving ones 
who raised yields for the long run while to date the dominant characteristic 
in the Western Sudan has been land mining leading to horrendous and 
potentially irreversible environmental degradation.
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The history of land law in the Sudan from the imposition of British (nominally 
Egypto-British condominium) rule is a necessary backdrop. The British created
- as in many other colonies - a multiple system.
The underlying land ownership was vested in the colonial state (by right of 
conquest over the Mahdist state). However, a series of subordinate tenures 
(which more or less fully ousted normal "Condominium" ownership) were the 
dominant forms of land holding and use.
The first broad group related to public sector irrigation and (less
prominently) rainfed schemes. Here land ownership was - and remains - vested 
in an Authority, e.g. the Gezira Board. In general it was compulsorily 
acquired from the third (traditional user right) form of landholding with
payment of some compensation in cash or alternative grazing rights.
The land was (and is) leased on tenancy contracts to farmers subject to
detailed husbandry (including crop, water use, etc) conditions and with 
definite credit, credit recovery and division of main crop (normally cotton 
but more recently sometimes wheat) proceeds. The tenants were rarely previous 
land users not so much by a will to exclude but because the shift from
pastoralism to regimented irrigated farming suited neither their preferences
nor their skills. Nominally sub-tenancies and share cropping (and less 
clearly absentee landlordism) are prohibited. In practice they have been rife
- in the Gezira scheme - for at least forty years. The cynical joke that 
Gezira tenancies are owned by merchants and urban landlords operated by kulak 
middle peasants but worked for a pittance by Nigerians who have run out of
money en route to or from Mecca overstates but has a major core of truth in
it.
Private irrigated (pump) holdings which are basically freehold tenure also 
date back to soon after the 1905 conquest. They are - when well run which is 
neither universal nor uncommon - rather like the public schemes except that 
the board and prime tenant are combined and sub-tenancies both legal and, 
apparently, less common albeit managers for absentee landlords are more so.
While substantial salination and other standard irrigation problems exist, 
this form of tenure and cultivation has (like its public enterprise analogue) 
been reasonably consistent with environmental stability.
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The third original form of tenure - then covering most useable land apart from 
the public and private irrigated sectors was traditional varying widely from 
area to area but basically communal ownership of land and allocation of use 
rights to male household heads. The use rights were in general secure so long 
as cultivation or herding use was maintained, usually de facto hereditable but 
not normally otherwise transferable.
Under the Nimeri government the political influence of the urban
trading/landlord sub-class (and of some pump scheme owners) and the newly 
recognised potential of large scale dry land grain (sorghum) cultivation and 
ranching for export led to substantial changes in the old system.
State lands were made transferable to freehold tenure. So de facto were 
traditional lands. The initial results were the acquisition of very large 
tracts of land - especially in the West - by private landlords and - to a
lesser extent public sector schemes. In many cases the land was not
unoccupied but either traditional rights had never been formally recognised or 
they were brushed aside, the main initial losers being semi-nomadic 
pastoralists. Further, the de jure requirement of consent from traditional 
allocating bodies (and of use right holders) to transfer from one form of 
tenure to another was frequently acquired by fraud, force or fiat
especially, perhaps, in respect to military officers and their relatives.
The initial land uses were primarily rain fed, mechanised sorghum cultivation 
and large herd extensive pastoralism. The first has raised sorghum output 
(and exports) dramatically but only in good rainfall years and at the cost of 
reducing the fertility of the soil and the defence against wind erosion. Some 
estimates suggest millions of hectares of land have been permanently ruined - 
six years is reckoned to be the maximum economic period of cropping (or mining 
out).
The ranching, in itself, is probably much less environmentally damaging in 
respect to the land used. But it has driven previous pastoral users onto
extra marginal pasturage leaving many no access to even semi-secure drought 
year pasturage. This almost certainly increased their 1981-84 drought period 
herd losses (by forced sale or death) and will probably prevent their herd 
rehabilitation during the current run of good years setting in train a 
degradation of marginal herding communities which has been more studied on the
-8-
other side of the Sahel in Mali, Niger, Senegal and Burkina.
The current phase of enclosure has moved to the wadi (seasonal river valley) 
country around Nyala and to parts of the Nuba Mountain zone not taken over in 
the first wave of land grabbing. The present (or at any rate recent past and 
in part remaining) users are small to medium scale peasant households 
practicing mixed farming with crops predominant and using hand (from streams) 
or pump (probably usually animal or hand powered) irrigation in a majority of 
cases. Many have been severely affected by the past drought - from which the 
West has not uniformly recovered - and the collapse of the sorghum price with 
the return of the rains, the paucity of transport and the fact that the 
inadequately financed government support price scheme for sorghum was largely 
snapped up by the big growers. A significant proportion are already heavily 
indebted to merchant money lenders and individual household disasters (e.g. 
deaths, illnesses, accidents, fires) and even happier events entailing 
financial burdens (e.g. marriages) are steadily raising that proportion.
The merchant money lenders are securing shifts of large hectarages from 
traditional to freehold tenure under the unrepealed Nimeri laws. The consent 
of many of the (heavily indebted) use right holders and community 
representatives/officials (perhaps equally indebted or desirous of an initial 
capital to enter merchanting or landlordism) is hardly among equals or arms 
length and indeed is precisely what traditional tenure’s codification (or at 
least legal recognition) was intended to avert.
Whether the new enclosure phase will be environmentally disastrous is not 
clear. More intensive irrigated farming may well be possible in many wadis 
but the limits to water flows and the soil composition (both in respect to 
salination and to drainage) are not well studied so significantly greater 
risks than those associated with the Nile schemes do exist. More clearly the 
consolidation of large freeholders (non-resident merchant money lenders in 
most cases) and the dispossession of peasant use right holders (and their 
descendants) will increase landlessness, inequality and the size of the very 
poor rural proletariat precisely at the time its previous lifeline of 
unskilled migrant labour jobs in Libya and the Gulf is fraying. While the 
shift will perhaps raise food output it is even more clearly going to raise 
hunger related to inability of rising numbers of families to produce 
(landless) or to buy (poverty level incomes) adequate food.
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The political economy of the present phase is somewhat puzzling. The West is 
the heartland of Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi’s Umma Party. The merchant 
money lenders are dominantly non-Western and their sub-class on the whole 
supports two rival parties (one an uneasy junior partner in the coalition, the
other the main opposition). Why therefore the victims cannot seek effective
political redress is less than clear albeit the concentration of the 
government in far away Khartoum on a full scale civil war and an apparently 
insoluble macro economic crisis presumably have much to do with it. So too 
may the rather ironic missionary zeal for unrestricted freehold tenure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa which its proponents (Reaganauts, international experts and 
African intellectuals and technocrats) do not seem to notice is the reverse of
the present trends in the Western European and North American zones which were
freehold tenures original birthplaces and heartlands.
The Bend of the River and the Burdens on the Bent Backs
Irrigation is widely pronounced to be the solution to Africa’s food problems. 
As the previous section suggests, even where irrigation does raise output on a 
basically sustainable basis at a plausible cost (conditions which are met in 
much of the Sudan), it may still be associated with increasing landlessness, 
poverty and hunger. But the Sudan is atypical. In the Sahel (or ’’Western 
Sudan") the French Office du Niger and its national and World Bank successors 
and copiers have a nearly unbroken half century record of failure even to 
secure adequate output increases to cover the capital cost of the schemes.
At least six basic problems arise from such schemes - as viewed from the point
of view of peasant households.
First crop selection is biased in terms of saleability by the 
operating/marketing authority of the scheme and of the absence of alternative 
buyers. The reasons are simple. Unless a crop is sold through marketing 
structures to which the operator has access (many staple food crops are not) 
then the operator cannot act as buyer and marketer and is, at best, in a weak 
position to cover input, management and debt service costs. Second, if other 
marketing channels exist then tenants may seek to sell via them to avoid 
operator charges (whether to recover costs or to attain a surplus). Third, if
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the capital cost of the scheme is largely financed by external loans the 
design and operation are likely to be further biased to crops which will yield 
foreign exchange for debt service, i.e. exports or - perhaps - direct import 
substitutes.
Second, the technology of large scale irrigation schemes - including, e.g. 
large dams, major irrigation channels, mechanised processing plants,
agricultural machinery - by its nature and scale is beyond peasant household 
capacity to finance, maintain, manage or even, in part, to operate. Unless - 
as is quite uncommon - specific efforts are made to build up peasant
competence to operate and maintain all aspects of the scheme as well as to 
participate substantively in management decisions there is a significant shift 
of production relations resulting from this loss of control over the technical
and immediate institutional aspects of production.
Third, the output and productivity effects of most large scale irrigation 
schemes in SSA have been below both expectations and the levels needed to 
cover operator management and production costs plus debt service while still 
raising peasant household net incomes. The reasons vary but the record of
technico economic unsuccess (or at the least marginal and below projection 
outturns) is general enough to raise serious questions about whether viable 
large scale irrigation scheme approaches viable in SSA exist except for a 
handful of special cases. The regular incantation of the words Gezira and 
Sudan do not answer these questions. Gezira, Er Roseires and Hashim el Ghirba 
are special cases, took a long time to come right economically and at least in 
the latter two cases have certain problematic aspects.
Fourth, the division of proceeds within most schemes is biased against the
peasant producer. Receipts are used first to recover administration and
production service costs, next to cover at least the interest portion of debt 
service and then to pay producers. As a result the producers are the most 
exposed to design or operation mistakes, bad weather (which can affect
irrigation schemes if it causes floods, limits availability of irrigation 
water or reduces the rain component of total moisture availability in cases in 
which this is significant) or falling output (rising input) prices.
The greater pressure under even World Bank style structural adjustment for 
improving public sector returns (less losses and/or higher surpluses)
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objectively increases both the overall offtake from gross receipts before 
peasant payments and their exposure as the first to be hit by adverse events 
external either to their own actions or to the project.
Fifth, the land use regulations of most schemes are hierarchical and 
inflexible (at least on paper). Households are required to grow set 
hectarages of particular crops in particular sequences using (and being 
charged for) specified inputs. The reasons are partly technical agronomic 
ones but this does not alter the nature of the resultant production relations. 
Further, some of the requirements seem intended to maximise dependence on 
scheme payments and labour supply for scheme marketed crops and - whether 
intentionally or not - to erode or destroy both basic household self 
provisioning and the rights of women to land and time to carry on that 
activity which are integral to a majority (not all) of Sub-Saharan African 
peasant agricultural systems.
Sixth, these schemes are among the few contexts to date in rural SSA in which 
debt bondage analagous to that in South Asia can arise. If output (or price) 
is low and/or costs high, many peasant households find it impossible both to 
pay for services used and to survive. In such cases a portion of service 
charges are usually rolled over and recharged (with interest) in the next 
season. (This pattern is reinforced in cases in which the tenant is nominally 
a proprietor and is charged for some improvements as a loan with regular 
interest and principal instalments.) In Sahelian schemes a substantial 
proportion of tenants appear to have sunk so far into debt that they cannot 
hope ever to escape from it.
In the past such tenants could 'escape' to the land frontier or to the 
domestic, regional or European migrant labour market frontier so that a debt 
hold was somewhat tenuous. However, increasing population has in many cases 
driven the land frontier into extra marginal and/or very risky zones, formal 
urban wage employment has in most cases been stagnant for at least half a 
decade and the regional European unemployment crises have virtually shut down 
that escape route for new entrants. Indeed, regionally, at least in West 
Africa, forced repatriation has almost certainly exceeded new entrants into 
employment in the main immigrant receiving labour markets (Ivory Coast, 
Nigeria) since the early 1980s.
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The combination of these factors has meant that large scale irrigation schemes 
tend to cause very far reaching sub-mode of production and production 
relations changes. These are by no means limited to overt plantation cases. 
Tenants are usually in fact, even if not in name, labour only contractors far 
more analagous to wage labourers than to independent petty commodity 
producers. However, unlike wage labourers they fear the primary risks of poor 
output levels, high cost or low prices. As supposedly arms length independent 
agents their incomes are subordinated to the contractual obligations of 
operators to salary and wage workers, input suppliers and lenders (a logical 
result of the present formal legal pattern albeit different contractual 
arrangements putting at least minimum peasant incomes as the first obligation 
could be drafted and implemented). Further, the nature of the agronomic 
regulations imposed on (’contracted by’) scheme tenants frequently both 
reduces the possibility of household self provisioning (objectively increasing 
the risk of food insecurity) and wipes out the contingent rights of women to a 
share of household land and labour time to produce food crops (empirically 
tending to increase child malnutrition).
These results are not unique to irrigated schemes although they are probably 
more marked in them. They also apply in varying degrees to regulated 
smallholder schemes which do have tight management, limitations on crops 
(including household food crops grown) and husbandry/purchase of services 
requirements as well as effective, compulsory single channel marketing. In 
extreme cases these are not true peasant or smallholder production at all but 
the substitution of sharecropping or de facto wage employment. The special 
features of many of the irrigation schemes - as noted - turn on the greater 
scale and complexity of the technology employed and the more dubious 
agroeconomic viability base which often mean a loss of food security, 
autonomy, status of women and net income.
Population and Weather: Monsters or Myths?
A rather popular brand of neo-Malthusianism argues that Sub-Saharan Africa is 
becoming over-populated at an accelerating pace and that this is the basic 
cause of food scarcity and environmental degradation. Another - sometimes 
analytically related - argument is that since the mid-1960s SSA rainfall has 
entered a period of cyclical decline causing retreat of the safe pastoral and
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tillage frontiers. Interacting with rising populations this has caused famine 
and environmental disaster in the former marginal but now, with reduced 
rainfall, extra marginal areas.
Counter arguments have been advanced equally forcefully. SSA's population per 
square kilometre is low compared to Europe or South Asia. Higher prices 
and/or higher yields not less people are needed. Rain (and drought) cycles 
have existed in SSA for centuries and did not formerly cause famine. 
Pre-colonial African tillage and rotation systems were environmentally sound; 
the environmental degradation problem relates to modernisation and production 
of export crops and could be cured by reversing these changes.
Held in these purist forms, the contentions create rather more heat than 
light; rather more sweeping generalisations than empirically tested specific 
analyses and rather more confusion than guidance on what needs to be and can 
be done.
An average population growth of 3Í a year is historically very high 
(unprecedented for SSA). Since 1960 SSA’s population has virtually doubled. 
Food production has risen - largely by increasing the area under cultivation 
and pastoral use and only secondarily (in some cases negatively) by raising 
output per hectare. But food production per capita has fallen in a majority
of countries and districts - on average by perhaps 15%. Given the objective
differences in natural potential (including soil quality and water 
availability) between SSA and South/Southeast Asia and in makeup of the labour 
force as well as capital available per agricultural labour force member simple 
comparisons with these areas are not very illuminating. Given present or 
known, tested and generaliseable techniques, several SSA countries have
populations which are objectively as high as the agricultural base will carry 
and many more will reach that area by 2000.
Since 1965 average annual rainfall in SSA has declined. In addition in at 
least some cases - particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa - its temporal 
distribution within the crop year seems to have worsened and the number of 
successive bad (or good) years to have risen. Whether these are secular or 
cyclical trends - and if cyclical over how long a period - is simply not 
known. The results - combined with pressing outward on the land frontier and 
pressing down on fallow periods on intra-marginal land - have been
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environmentally damaging well beyond their short term physical food supply and 
medium (at best) term directly affected household impoverishment effects.
Cyclical fluctuations in weather are indeed known to have affected SSA for 
centuries albeit detailed recording is not available and systematic 
reconstruction of probable past weather patterns is in its infancy. That they 
did not cause famine is by no means so clear. Arguably the fall of some 
medieval Sudanic and savannah political units did relate to droughts. Some 
famines are recorded as are population movements probably related to drought 
pressure on food supplies and much easier to achieve/enforce when populations 
were much lower and substantial tracts of intra-marginal land while not empty 
were very sparsely settled.
Reversing ’modernisation' in techniques might in some cases arrest 
environmental damage on some land. But that does not in fact solve the 
underlying problems. If the population increase continues - as it clearly 
will for decades, the real question is whether the present 3% a year average 
falls or rises by 0.5Í a year - then more food and non-food crops are needed. 
If less intensive techniques are reinstated more hectarage will be needed. As 
the land frontier in most cases is already into environmentally fragile zones 
not capable of holding up under existing techniques the result is likely to be 
at least as much and probably more overall environmental degradation.
The total elimination of non-food (more precisely non-domestic food) crops 
might free 15% of existing land in the average SSA economy. It would in most 
cases also reduce the value of agricultural output and the incomes of 
substantial numbers of households (net as well as gross). By reducing the 
availability of domestic inputs into manufacturing (e.g. cotton, rubber, 
tobacco, sisal) it would increase import requirements and by cutting exports 
(up to 90% in some SSA economies) it would reduce import capacity. In the 
absence of changes in productivity this might buy 5 years of time before the 
food production problem returned to its present levels. As with reversals of 
'modernisation' there are doubtless cases in which switches from non-food 
crops (or herds) to domestic food production are desirable but neither offers 
any general solution.
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The argument was, that many - not all - peasant long rotation cropping and 
some pastoral systems were environmentally sustainable. Similarly a 
substantial number of techniques including intercropping and minimum tillage 
(hoe as opposed to plough) were - and are - more in consonance with many 
African soil/environmental contexts than pure stands and deep ploughing.
But.... the long rotation systems depended on up to 20 years so-called bush 
fallow (bush and tree regeneration) following 3 to 5 years cultivation, a 
pattern which is in a majority of districts not sustainable at present 
population levels. For a majority of African soil/climate combinations no 
sustainable, environmentally benign system of cultivation - or at least none 
which is economically viable - is known. A shortened or eliminated fallow 
period with the old clearing, burning, low input cultivation methods is 
certainly very rarely viable or sustainable in the long run.
Similarly, the sustainable pastoral syterns usually involved are not merely 
seasonal movement of herds but also fallback pastures used only or almost only 
in years of abnormally low rainfall. As these were normally on land suitable 
for crops the requirements for sustaining these patterns of pastoralism 
involve both human and animal population ceilings and a surplus of tillable 
land over demand (or firm political domination by the pastoral population 
groups). These conditions are no longer generally met and are steadily 
becoming even less common.
The land frontier problem interacts with these factors in a humanly and 
environmentally damaging way. Higher population density forces out the margin 
of tillage. Much of the land is either unsuitable for cropping or suitable 
only in years of above average rainfall or with higher than average capital 
investment. As the households pushed onto these sub or extra marginal lands 
tend to have below average assets and incomes (and in some cases a 
disproportionately high proportion of female headed households) the above 
average capital requirement can rarely be met in cash or labour power and the 
units are often very small preventing either mixed farming to lessen risk or 
amassing food (or cash) reserves for bad years.
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The impact on pastoral societies is often even worse. Pushing out the 
cultivation frontier necessarily pushes out the pastoral frontier even if the 
pastoral societies’ numbers are not rising (which they usually are). The 
average quality and security of their grazing is diminished. Further their 
fallback drought year pasturage is ’eliminated', i.e. under permanent tillage.
The effects are much farther reaching than cattle (and other stock) losses 
and severe food problems in bad years. In Niger the cultivation margin has 
been pushed scores of kilometres north since 1960. At least one pastoral 
people were pushed onto pasturage capable of sustaining adequate herds only in 
good years and probably by no means optimal even in them. As a result 1970s 
and 1980s drought cycle losses appear to have been proportionately more severe 
than in previous drought cycles. Further, natural herd regeneration for these 
people (albeit not for Niger as a whole) after the 1970s drought was 
inadequate to bring their herds back to pre-1973 levels before the 19 81 onset 
of a new drought phase.
As a result a series of social disintegration and production relations changes 
which are unequivocably negative for this pastoral society have been set in 
motion. Migration of an increasing proportion of household members to urban 
(normally low income informal sector) employment/self employment has become 
essential to survival and to the hope (usually not realised) of saving cash to 
buy animals to replenish herds. In addition, merchants and large crop farmers 
who acquired animals during or at the end of the drought have been in a 
position to set up a growing, highly exploitative (in both the vulgar and 
technical senses) tending system of hiring pastoralists to tend their flocks
for little more than their dairy by-products. They are not pure wage earners
in that the risk of animal deaths falls largely on them. As they do not
benefit from animal weight, quality or increase in numbers they - the
pastoralists/herdsmen - have no incentive to use the best practices they know 
so that neither in production nor environmental terms does the new system have 
much to be said for it.
With the exception of a few pastorally led governing coalitions - notably 
Botswana’s - pastoralists have tended to be the end of the line in access to 
land, to services and to effective drought relief/rehabilitation assistance. 
This has been true even in countries - e.g. Niger, Mali - in which the 
pastoral sub-sector has historically been at least as important economically
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and in terms of households dependent on it as the arable. The reasons are 
partly technical - where practicable cropping can normally support more people 
in a given area than cropping; partly knowledge (African pastoralism probably 
has even less of a bank of relevant, tested, economically viable, user 
friendly techniques available for use today than does cropping); partly 
location - the end of the capital city, smaller town, main crop area, outlying 
arable, pastoral axis. But largely they are political - pastoralists (with 
rare exceptions) have not been leading members of governing coalitions. This 
is partly a colonial legacy as most pastoral societies received exceptionally 
little education during that period and, in practice, an educated elite has 
been crucial to securing and sustaining power but the causal factors would 
appear to be more complex and perhaps more context specific than education 
alone or even education plus role in the colonial territorial economic system.
Work: More? Less? Different?
One standard critique of African peasants - usually by observers who
concentrated on men - has been that they did not work long enough. For
example, in Tanzania, 1960s estimates of eight hour days worked by peasant 
farmers outside tree crop areas tended to be in the 90 to 150 range. On the 
other hand more recent analysis - concentrating on rural women - suggests that 
too much work (up to 15 hours a day average) is a crushing burden.
Both of these generalisations are too sweeping. So is the newest conventional
wisdom that in all SSA peasant (or at any rate cropping) societies women do 
80Í of the work on food crop production. That overlooks the fact that work 
patterns in which women do not do field agricultural labour at all are by no 
means unknown in SSA nor limited to (or universal among) Moslem societies. 
And neither offers any automatic guide to policy.
It is a fact that in most rain fed arable systems (and to a lesser extent some 
pastoral ones) ’enforced, undesired leisure' is prevalent at some seasons 
because non-agricultural income generating activities are scarce (or the 
income generated almost invisible) and low input, rainfed agriculture has very 
uneven labour requirements over the year. Given the actual gender divisions 
of labour, ’enforced leisure' is commoner for men than for women.
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It is also a fact that studies in some crop centred societies suggest that 
women do work up to 15 hours a day. In such cases a stylized makeup of male 
and female labour inputs in hours per day averaged over the year might be:
Male Female
Provisioning Crops i5 2
Cash Crops ) )
Other Income Generating ) 3 ) 3
Activity ) )
Wooding 0 - i 2 - 3
Watering 0 “ 5 3 - 4
Household Other 1 3
Total 41 - 51 13 - 15
In general the actual tasks within each category are likely to diverge for men 
and women. Construction (e.g. of houses) and land clearing are usually
dominantly male; walking to fetch water (and only slightly less so, wood) and 
weeding are almost always female. Male income generation centres on cash
crops (i.e. crops grown to be sold whether as domestic food, for industrial 
use or for export) and on wage or informal self employed labour; female often 
(perhaps more so in West Africa) on food processing and small to medium scale 
commerce.
Examination of these patterns do suggest several policy points only some of 
which are intuitively obvious to policy makers and technicians:
a. off season opportunities for work which raises quality of life and 
especially future productive potential is needed - especially for men. 
This can include decentralised, low cash input community works and/or 
seasonal public works employment, e.g. small scale irrigation, education,
extension and health facility (including staff housing) construction,
improved farm family housing and storage construction, small scale civil 
engineering (e.g. wells, semi all-weather tracks, erosion control works), 
reafforestation for environmental protection linked with fuel, food and
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fodder provision and cash income generation;
b. labour reducing technologies (subject to their capital cost) are needed 
for peak labour requirement periods usually including soil preparation, 
planting and harvest. One example - perhaps a non obvious one - is 
introducing new crops whose labour input requirement time profile 
diverges significantly from present main crops thus reducing peak period 
bottlenecks;
c. however, for women the prime need is for labour saving innovations
perhaps particularly in respect to wooding (fuelling), watering and - 
sometimes - food preparation. As their seasonal time profiles typically 
do not include a long ’slack' season the need to concentrate on labour 
saving at particular times is less than for male labour time. 
Reafforestation (e.g. household or community woodlots) and small scale 
'waterworks' (wells, spring protection, trenched pipes, check dams) are 
perhaps especially relevant in this context as these activities
frequently bulk large in demands on women's time and because the
construction labour input requirements frequently fall dominantly on the 
male side of the traditional division of labour;
d. because there are few - if any - peasant households without what they
perceive as basic needs which can be met only by cash, cash income
generating opportunities need to be increased. To the extent that one 
specific goal is increased child welfare there is need for particular
attention to women's opportunities as in practice most expenditures on 
children are made by women. In many cases increased cash earnings - 
whether from crops or otherwise - can directly augment food security
because at present the only access to needed cash is to sell a portion of 
already inadequate food production which could and would be reserved for 
household use if other cash generating activities were available;
e. specific case by case attention to gender division of labour and of land
and labour use rights is needed to avoid unpleasant surprises. For 
example, if well construction and tree planting are male but well
maintenance and tree tending are female, women must be involved in 
project design and skills training or there will be 'inexplicably' high 
proportions of broken down wells and dead seedlings. More generally it
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matters whether - within a household - women do not till land, till 
jointly with men on the same land, till separate plots themselves or are 
primarily responsible for separate plots but have certain obligations to 
make labour inputs to the male head of household’s plots and also certain 
claims on male household members' labour time for specific tasks in 
relation to their plots. (The last is probably the commonest pattern.)
Conclusion, Confusion, Confrontation
The foregoing examples and reflections clearly do not lead by themselves to 
any general, let alone specific contextual packages of measures to be taken. 
In one sense they are - and are intended to be - destructive. They stress 
complexity and contextuality because the record of approaches which reduced 
the number of relevant problems and constraints to one or two and assumed that 
a general Sub-Saharan context uniform and simple enough to make directly 
applicable policies on an off the shelf, continental basis existed is very 
poor indeed. Occam's razor is one thing - crude reductionism quite another 
and while the horizontal distance between the two may sometimes be narrow, the 
chasm between tends to be quite deep. Similarly, it is useful to identify 
common (in the sense of frequent, not of universal) factors and to construct 
tentative systemic analytical schema from them but very dangerous to assume 
that tentative conclusions can be assumed to be applicable to all cases and 
contexts - some will be exceptions - or applicable without adaptation to more 
than a handful.
Whether the examples suggest the need for inter or multi disciplinary work as 
normally described is unclear. They do suggest that a number of elements 
ranging from population patterns and levels through land tenure systems 
(including intra household ones) are frequently relevant. Clearly no one 
person or discipline can be an expert on all of these. However, most of the 
particular points made here are at the least not universally emphasised (or 
even accepted) by analysts and practitioners of the disciplines with which 
they are most closely linked whether demography or law, pastoral sociology or 
gender relations. The requirement therefore seems in one sense to be one for 
a particular type of generalism linked to a readiness to look for new 
interactions (sometimes called lateral thinking) both by groups of people (who 
may individually all be specialists) and by individuals.
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Unfortunately it is not at all clear that the current thrusts either in 
research or in policy making and implementation - especially by Afrians in 
Africa - are moving in that direction. There appear to be conflicting 
tendencies. The lessons of experience - to the extent they do not force total 
day to day crisis management to the exclusion of even medium term analysis and 
reformulation on the applied personnel - probably do thrust in the direction 
suggested. But the quest for quality defined as rigorousness and especially 
complex, quantified analysis frequently leads to increased specialisation and 
to models which reduce the numbers of variables and inter-relationships (and 
the forms in which they may be specified) to a degree which raises very real 
dangers of tunnel vision and reductionism. On the whole, both the reward 
structures (in prestige as well as pecuniary) and the premium placed on 
apolitical, easily generalizable, specific expertise by international and 
first world development agencies and by the global (dominantly northern) 
professional and academic communities tend to reinforce the second tendency. 
Certainly the approach advocated needs a foundation of more and more rigorous 
specialised knowlege than is now available. But it also requires an 
orientation - at least among a substantial critical mass of academics, 
managers, policy makers and applied professionals - to seek to explore 
interactions among specialised bodies of knowledge and their relation to 
specific contexts in order to arrive at time and place specific operational 
(as well as analytical) syntheses.
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